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Abstract 
Research evidence on the impact of relative income position on individuals’ attitudes and 
behaviour is sorely lacking. Therefore, using the International Social Survey Programme 1998 
data from 26 countries this paper investigates the impact of relative income on 14 
measurements of social capital. We find support for a considerable deleterious positional 
concern effect of persons below the reference income. This effect is more sizeable by far 
than the beneficial impact of a relative income advantage. Most of the results indicate that 
such an effect is non-linear. Lastly, changing the reference group (regional versus national) 
produces no significant differences in the results. 
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SOCIAL CAPITAL AND RELATIVE INCOME CONCERNS: 




Concerns about relative position is, according to Frank (1999, p. 145), a “deep-rooted and 
ineradicable element in human nature”. Its social repercussions have long preoccupied human 
secular self-reflection and contemplation.
1 In economics theory, Adam Smith (1759/1976), 
like  his  successors  Karl  Marx  (1849)  and  Thorstein  Veblen  (1899),  emphasized  the 
importance of relative position and social concerns. Since then, these ideas have been stressed 
by modern economists such as Arthur Pigou (1920), John Maynard Keynes (1930), James 
Duesenberry (1949) and Harvey Leibenstein (1950). In contrast to the traditional standard 
utility theory position that individuals evaluate their welfare only in absolute terms, the theory 
of the creation of position concerns assumes that individual welfare depends on comparisons 
with  others.  Whereas  Smith  (1759/1976)  proposed  relative  wants  as  central  to  human 
behaviour and Marx (1849) emphasized that humans measure their desiderata and pleasure in 
relation to society, Veblen’s (1899) concepts of conspicuous leisure and consumption stress 
the importance of an individual’s relative position in society. Subsequently, by developing a 
utility concept characterized by systematically interdependent utilities, Duesenberry (1949) 
incorporated relative preferences into consumer theory. Even Marshall (1961), often seen as 
the  creator  of  modern  demand  theory,  notes  the  relevance  of  human  distinction,  while 
Leibenstein  (1950)  stresses  the  non-fiction  demand  for  consumption  goods  due  to,  for 
example, a bandwagon effect in which others’ behaviour affects individual choices.  
It is therefore surprising that many economists have largely neglected this aspect. In 
particular, there is a dearth of empirical research into the impact of relative income position   4   
on individual attitudes and behaviour (see Senik, 2005). Moreover, of the studies on the effect 
of relative income position that do exist, most focus on its association with happiness rather 
than its impact on social capital (e.g., Dorn et al., 2007, Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005). Besides its 
narrow focus, the empirical research on the impact of the relative income position has also 
been  hindered  by  lack  of  data  or  inadequate  methodology.  As  Ferrer-i-Carbonell  (2005) 
points out, “most economists have used (and are fond of) cross-section micro-empirical data, 
i.e., data at the individual level and for only one country” (p. 998). However, not only do 
relatively new international survey data sources now allow detailed investigation of social 
capital for a variety of countries, but more sophisticated statistical techniques and designs are 
also enabling researchers to take advantage of cross-national variations in these data.  
To remedy this research void, this paper contributes to the recent discussion in two 
aspects: first, by employing 14 different measures of social capital it aims to produce detailed 
evidence on the impact of positional concerns and social capital, reflecting four different 
dimensions of social capital: generalized trust, confidence in institutions, compliance with 
social  norms,  and  civic  engagement.  In  addition,  our  study  overcomes  methodological 
shortcomings by using survey data from the 1998 wave (RELIGION II) of the International 
Social Survey Programme (ISSP), which not only covers approximately 24’000 persons in 26 
countries. Moreover, in line with some previous studies, we include an almost complete set of 
control variables to better isolate partial correlations between relative income position and 
social capital (see Appendix Table A1).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical 
approach and predictions. Section 3 describes the dataset, and Section 4 presents the empirical 
results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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II. THE EFFECT OF RELATIVE INCOME POSITION ON SOCIAL 
CAPITAL 
 
II.1 The Role of Relative Income Position in Society 
 
In social science theory, positional concerns have historically been thought to play a role in 
the interaction between people as many economic and social phenomena might be explained 
by the interdependence of individuals’ utilities. Since Kant’s (1785/1964) early contribution 
of the importance of social comparisons, social psychology, sociology and anthropology have 
also  traditionally  placed  much  emphasis  on  the  relevance  and  fundamentality  of  relative 
preferences  to  human  motivation  (see,  e.g.,  Festinger,  1954  for  the  theory  of  social 
comparison;  Stouffer,  1949  for  the  theory  of  relative  deprivation).  In  addition,  several 
economists have elaborated on the concept of interdependent preferences, whose inclusion in 
economic theory allows social comparisons (e.g., Becker, 1974; Easterlin, 1974; Scitovsky, 
1976; Schelling, 1978; Pollak, 1976; Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978; Frank, 1985; Akerlof and 
Yellen, 1990). According to Frank (1991), not only do individual decisions have important 
consequences for the decision-maker herself, but they also generate what he terms positional 
externalities. To illustrate, he shows how such welfare comparisons between individuals help 
explain the existence of such diverse elements as 24-hour supermarkets, excessive formalism 
in  economics,  cycles  of  fashion  and  public  spiritedness,  muddled  bureaucratic  language, 
excessive cosmetic surgery and pressures to consume growth hormones. He concludes that 
“…the more we learn about them, the more likely  it  seems that actions without external 
effects may be the real exceptions” (p. 44). McAdams (1992) points out that social scientists 
have  neglected  the  aspect  of  positional  concerns,  but  have  challenged  the  concept  of 
selfishness:  “primarily by exploring ways in which preferences are positively dependent on 
each other, as when empathy, altruism, or moral commitment cause one person to desire that   6   
others be able to satisfy their own desires. Much less has been said about the extent to which 
preferences  are  negatively  interdependent,  and  the  economic  consequences  of  such 
preferences” (p. 3). 
Positional concerns may translate into envy, when the individual’s current situation is 
below his or her own aspiration level. In philosophy, in which envy has been viewed “as one 
of the inescapable questions of existence” (Schoeck, 1966, p. 194), Zeckhauser (1991, p. 9) 
also  stresses  that  “Envy  ...  is  a  subtle  and  powerful  feeling,  motivating  everything  from 
political  movements  to  murders”.  It  is  Kant  (1785/1964)  who  provides  a  well-developed 
definition:  
Envy (livor) is a tendency to perceive with displeasure the good of others, 
although it in no way detracts from one’s own, and which, when it leads to 
action  (in  order  to  diminish  that  good)  is  called  qualified  envy,  but 
otherwise  only  ill-will  (invidentia);  it  is  however  only  an  indirect, 
malevolent frame of mind, namely a disinclination to see our own good 
overshadowed by  the good of others, because we take its measure not 
from its intrinsic worth, but by comparison with the good of others and 
then go on to symbolize that evaluation. (Cited in Schoeck 1966, p. 201)  
 
Ainslie  (1992)  argues  that  “putting  oneself  in another’s  shoes  may  offer  a  single, 
distinct,  and  thus  robust  alternative  to  the  perception  of  life  in  one’s  own  shoes.  This 
alternative perception of reality is experienced as envy” (p. 323). Not only do social scientists 
– including social psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists – stress 
the  important  role  of envy  in everyday  life  (e.g., Foster,  1967; Elster, 1991), but  several 
economists, primarily in 1970s literature on welfare economics, also discuss the significance 
of envy (e.g., Foley, 1967; Brennan, 1973; Varian, 1974; Archibald and Donaldson, 1979).   7   
Subsequently, using a rational choice framework, Mui (1995) incorporates envy into standard 
economic theory to explore agents’ sabotage or retaliative behaviour against others.  
In  real  life,  individuals’  relative  judgements  of  their  own  positions  do  appear 
commonplace (see Frank, 1985; Frank and Sunstein, 2001; Solnick and Hemenway, 1998; 
Zeckhauser, 1991; Tversky and Griffing, 1993; Johansson-Stenman et al., 2002 and Alpizar et 
al., 2005). That is, people tend to compare themselves with their environment and care greatly 
about their relative position, which in turn influences their attitudes and observable behaviour. 
Moreover, as German social scientist Helmut Schoeck (1966) amply demonstrates, positional 
concerns are a widespread social phenomenon that engenders myriad everyday actions aimed 
at  reducing it. For example,  school uniforms are thought to  reduce possible envy among 
pupils and schoolteachers may ask parents not to incite envy in classmates by packing special 
treats in their children’s lunchboxes (Elster, 1991). An extreme example occurred in China 
during the Cultural Revolution when farmers owning fruit trees were ordered to cut them 
down (Zhang and Sang, 1987, cited in Elster, 1991).  
Indeed,  systematic  tests  carried  out  by  psychologists  and  economists  suggest  that 
people do take into account relative income position when making real life decisions such as 
choosing between two earning schemes. Economic psychologists Frank and Sunstein (2001) 
hypothesize two possible worlds: in world A, the individual earns $110,000 a year, while 
colleagues earn $200,000; in alternative world B, the individual earns less than in world A 
($100,000 per year), but the others earn only $85,000 (p. 336). In a traditional economic 
approach, world A should be preferable because it offers higher absolute wage. However, the 
choices  made  by  test  subjects  paint  a  different  picture  –  that is,  a  substantial  number  of 
respondents  opted  for  world  B,  thereby  confirming  Frank’s  (1985)  earlier  findings  using 
similar  tests.  Solnick  and  Hemenway  (1998),  who  test  257  faculty,  students  and  staff 
members at Harvard School of Public Health using a similar scenario, find that approximately 
50 percent of their respondents preferred the world in which they had a higher relative income   8   
position. Likewise, Johansson-Stenman et al. (2002) and Alpizar et al. (2005) find evidence 
that both absolute and relative income, as well as consumption, matter for individual utility or 
well-being. Finally, Tversky and Griffin (1993), in a study of the relation between envy and 
happiness,  observe  that  85  percent  of  their  test  subjects  chose the  world  with  the  higher 
absolute salary and the lower relative position. However, interestingly, 62 percent anticipated 
a higher job satisfaction in the world with the higher relative income position. Similar results 
are also reported for comparisons at the macro level (e.g., Zeckhauser, 1991).  
Experimental  economists  have  also  discovered  the  relevance  of  incorporating 
positional concerns into such research tasks as explaining outcomes in ultimatum games in 
which two or more persons must agree on how to share a given amount of money (see, e.g., 
Kirchsteiger, 1994). Frank and Sunstein (2001) stress that “… preference for good relative 
position does not explain all of what occurs in the game; ensuring a fair outcome, which may 
or may not call for good relative position, is often the driving factor. But relative position also 
counts for many participants, so much so that ‘difference aversion’ appears to motivate a 
significant percentage of participants” (p. 344). A decade earlier, Elster (1991) had even gone 
so  far  as  to  criticize  the  sense  of  fairness  that  characterizes  experimental  evidence  from 
ultimatum games, suggesting that a sense of envy “would sometimes be more appropriate for 
analogous behaviour in real life” (p. 66). Thus, the welfare of an envious person increases the 
danger that others’ assets will be destroyed, even when such destruction has its own costs. 
To  operationalise  this  concept  for  empirical  research  it  is  necessary  to  define  an 
appropriate proxy for ‘positional concerns’, our focal predictor of the emergence of social 
capital. ‘As economists, we recognize the central role of individual’s income in determining 
one’s social position in relation to her peers, as it is income that constitutes the financial 
constraint to an individual’s possibility set (consumption possibilities) and affects well-being. 
In line with the previously discussed experimental findings, positional concerns are assumed 
to arise when one’s own income is lower than a specific aspiration level that, in turn, is   9   
determined  by  one’s  own  expectations.  Although  appealing  as  theoretical  construct,  the 
individual aspiration income, however, is barely directly observable in real life. However, 
following the approach taken by the empirical happiness research, we believe that aspiration 
income can be approximated by employing the concept of observable reference income that 
we define as the median income of the reference group. In other words, we believe that the 
measure  of  ‘relative  income  position’  allows  to  investigate  the  implications  of  positional 
concerns on social capital (also providing an indirect insight into the consequences of envy). 
Moreover, using the concept of relative income, one can also investigate to which extent an 
advantageous  income  position,  namely  a  position  beyond  the  reference  income,  affects 
happiness and social capital.  
 
 
II.2 Dependent Variables: Social Capital 
 
Economists have discovered social capital – widely studied and highly prominent in all social 
sciences  –  to  be  an  important  determinant  of  economic  phenomena  like  macroeconomic 
performance. For example, Knack and Keefer (1997), in a cross-sectional analysis, find a 
strong and significantly positive relationship between social capital variables (civic duty) and 
economic growth. Schaltegger and Torgler (2007), using data for a synthetic panel of Swiss 
cantons over the 1981–2001 period, show that trust enhances fiscal performance. As regards 
public finance, Slemrod (1998) argues that social capital – measured as the willingness to pay 
taxes voluntarily – lowers the cost of government operations and of equitably assigning such 
cost to citizens. Such research justifies a closer look at what shapes social capital.  
  The  notion  of  social  capital  encompasses  multiple  aspects.  In  this  paper,  we 
distinguish  its  multiple  facets  along  four  different  dimensions:  trust  between  people, 
confidence of the people in institutions, compliance with social norms, and the creation of   10   
networks  (Putnam,  2001;  Bjørnskov,  2005).  However,  both,  trust  among  people  and,  the 
people’s trust in national institutions are often viewed as two facets of one dimension (see, 
e.g., Glaeser et al., 2000; Knack, 2000; Uslaner, 2002).  
Because generalized trust, the belief that most people can be trusted, does not depend 
on a specific individual or on group characteristics (see, e.g., Uslaner, 2002), we measure it 
using the following question: “Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted 
or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?”. Generalized trust is also expressed 
by the perception of others’ fairness towards oneself (e.g., “How often do you think that 
people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance and how often would they try 
to be fair?”).  
Whereas generalized trust is shaped by the horizontal relation between citizens, trust 
in (state) institutions is a key factor in measuring the vertical interaction between citizens and 
the state or other organizations. Thus, in a further step, we also include four questions – such 
as  “How  much  confidence  do  you  have  in  institution  X?”  –  to  test  several  facets  of 
particularized or institutional trust. The important institutions to be analysed are parliament, 
the courts and legal system, businesses and industries, and social institutions like the church 
and religious organisations. 
  The second dimension of social capital, compliance with social norms, is measured 
using questions related to tax morale, government benefit morale and compliance with legal 
norms. Because traditional economic models of tax evasion predict far too little compliance 
and far too much infringement, tax compliance seemingly depends on numerous factors that 
go beyond standard economic concepts like deterrence. To resolve this conundrum, many 
researchers suggest that the intrinsic motivation for individuals to pay taxes – what in the 
literature is termed ‘tax morale’ – helps explain these high levels of tax compliance (see, e.g., 
Lewis, 1982; Roth et al., 1989; Alm et al., 1992, 1999; Pommerehne et al., 1994; Frey, 1997, 
2003; Frey and Feld, 2002; Torgler, 2002, 2003, 2005a, 2006a, 2007). Thus, in line with   11   
previous  research  (see  Torgler,  2005b,  c),  we  assess  the  level  of  tax  morale  using  the 
following question: “Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if a taxpayer does not report all of 
his or her income in order to pay less income taxes?”. The benefit morale (see Halla and 
Schneider, 2005; Torgler 2006b) – that is, the acceptance of claiming government benefits 
without being entitled to them – we investigate in a similar manner. Compliance with legal 
norms like criminal and traffic laws is measured by the following moral dilemma: “Suppose 
you were riding in a car driven by a close friend. You know he is going too fast. He hits a 
pedestrian. He asks you to tell the police that he was obeying the speed limit.” Thus, our 
social norm variables are proxies for three different ethical questions in daily life.  
  The networking aspect of social capital we measure by the level of civic engagement 
in  voluntary  work,  such  as  charitable  activities,  religious  and  church-related  activities, 
political activities and so forth. This set of social capital variables alone relates not to attitudes 
but  to  actual  self-reported  behaviour.  Moreover,  such  activities  generate  more  intense 
interactions  between  people,  particularly  between  group  members  (Putnam,  2000).  This 
networking aspect is measured by the following question: “How often in the last 12 months 
did  you  do  volunteer  in  any  of  the  following  areas…?”  Obviously,  building  up  a  social 
network through such interactions between people is linked to the degree of trust within a 
community. In addition, it seems probable that networks might generate positive externalities 
and  thus  more  trust  among  and  in  those  people  who  are  not  formally  part  of  such 
organizations;  for  example,  strangers  in  the  community  (Putnam,  2000).  Nevertheless, 
evidence for such externalities is not detectable in the empirical literature (for an overview, 
see Bjørnskov, 2005).  
Finally,  we investigate happiness, a variable that cannot  be interpreted as a  social 
capital  variable  but  that  nevertheless  has a  strong  connection  with  it.  Specifically,  social 
networks may have a strong positive impact on happiness (see, e.g., Baker, 2005) and so 
might generalised trust among people and in institutions. Moreover, in contrast to the other   12   
variables, happiness, as alluded to earlier and shown in the next section, is a key variable in 
the research stream on the impact of relative income position. As such, happiness serves as a 
type of benchmark variable.  
 
 
II.3 Hypotheses: ‘Keeping Up with the Joneses’ 
 
This paper aims to test the importance of individuals’ positional concerns for societies’ level 
of social capital. In general, the study assumes that individuals’ contribution to the creation of 
social  capital  and  their  level  of  subjective  well-being  depends  on  the  negative  distance 
between  their  own  and  the  reference  group’s  median  income.  We  formulate  our  formal 
hypotheses based on pioneer work in the happiness literature on the impact of relative income 
position. Thus, our main objective is to develop hypotheses that investigate the consequences 
on social capital when someone is below the reference income, who is then conjectured to be 
concerned with her income position. Nonetheless, our research will also provide evidence to 
which extent an advantage in the relative income position affects happiness and social capital. 
We may observe that an advantage in the relative income position has a positive impact on 
happiness or social capital. However, it is not per se clear whether we can expect a symmetric 
or asymmetric relationship. Moreover, it should be noted that previous studies have strongly 
neglected to investigate this aspect.  
The happiness literature has found strong support that positional concerns based on 
income  matter.  Not  only  do  Clark  and  Oswald  (1996)  suggest  that  the  dependence  of 
happiness on relative income is “one of the most interesting ideas in social science” (p. 359), 
but Frank and Sunstein (2001) point to “happiness surveys conducted over time in a variety of 
countries” as “perhaps the most striking evidence of the importance of relative position” (p. 
337). Indeed, much happiness research finds strong evidence for the positive impact of an   13   
advantageous relative position on subjective well-being (Dorn et al., 2007; Luttmer, 2005; 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005).
2 Based on these happiness studies, we first predict the following: 
 
Hypothesis  1:  Whether  or  not  individuals  are  able  to  keep  up  with  the  Joneses’ 
(reference group) affect their subjective well-being. Not being able to keep up with the 
Joneses’ reduces their happiness.  
 
Individuals’ positional concerns may also affect their contributions to the generation of social 
capital. For example, can we claim that they affect the generalized trust level; that is, the 
mutual trust among people? Most particularly, disadvantages in the relative income position 
are  linked  with  frustration  (“it  could  have  or  should  have  been  me”),  unhappiness  and 
resignation of not being able to ‘keep up with the Joneses’. Feelings of frustration might 
equally be caused by the impression of being economically exploited by those who are better 
off  in  society,  particularly  when  individuals  believe  that  the  income  distribution  was  the 
outcome of an unequal distribution of power between economic agents rather than the result 
of  market  forces  under  perfect  competition.  In  other  words,  feelings  of  exploitation  and 
deprivation might arise if societal wealth was unequally distributed among its producers in an 
unfair manner. In consequence, such feelings of relative deprivation may lead not only to 
distrust of the Joneses (i.e., the reference group) but also of other citizens, which reduces the 
generalized trust and the perceived fairness level. Based on these thoughts, we develop our 
second hypothesis.  
 
Hypothesis  2:    Positional  concerns  decrease  people’s  trust  in  others  and  their 
perceptions of others’ fairness.  
   14   
In addition, individuals may blame the state or its institutions for generating an unfair 
distribution of the societal wealth pie and, consequently, the relative income disadvantage 
they experience compared to the Joneses. Thus, frustration and feelings of exploitation may 
lead not only to a decrease in trust at the horizontal level (generalized trust) but also at the 
vertical  level;  that  is,  the  relation  between  an  individual  and  her  government  or  other 
institutions that shape society (and implicitly her individual choice set). The degree to which 
these social institutions are held responsible by individuals for their current social position 
may depend on the perceived degree to which these institutions influence societal outcomes. 
For example, parliament is linked to the current politico-economic level; the courts and the 
legal system, to the constitutional level. Because of stronger long-term effects (blaming the 
‘rules of the game’), we may expect a stronger impact of positional concerns on institutions at 
the constitutional level. On the other hand, short-term and unexpected policy changes are 
more prominent among the law-making bodies, where previous decisions are overruled faster 
and new governments occur more often. The influence of these institutions at the current 
politico-economic  level  might  be  particularly  strong  when  people  have  adjusted  their 
aspiration levels to the long-term determinants of their social position. Moreover, because 
positional concerns are widely present in the workplace (see, e.g., Layard, 2003; Elster, 1991; 
Frank  and  Sunstein,  2001),  we  may  also  see  an  impact  on  individuals’  trust  in  the 
environment  of  business  and  industry  in  which  they  are  involved  daily.  In  other  words, 
individuals may blame business or industry for their relative income disadvantage, which 
could lead to a decreased level of trust in that social sector. On the other hand, trust increases 
if individuals’ have an advantage in the relative income Thus, our third hypothesis suggests 
the following: 
   15   
Hypothesis  3:  The  disadvantageous  relative  income  position  is  detrimental  to 
individuals’ trust in societal institutions such as the courts, parliament and business 
and industry.  
 
In contrast, religious institutions provide moral constitutions for a society. On the one 
hand, religion acts as a type of ‘supernatural police’ that provides a certain level of enforced 
compliance  with  socially  accepted  rules  (Anderson  and  Tollison,  1992).  Equally,  it 
encourages the production of social goods such as moral behaviour rooted in, for example, the 
Ten  Commandments  (Hull  and  Bold,  1994).  On  the  other  hand  (and  more  specifically), 
positional concerns may be controlled and restrained by religion. Fundamentally, all world 
religions teach the avoidance of envy. For example, according to Jewish tradition, causing 
others to feel ashamed and creating envy through one’s own behaviour is unlawful. Similarly, 
in  the  Qur’an,  Mohammed  describes  envy  as  a  sickness  and  the  “shearer  of  religion”. 
Buddhism regards envy as one of the so-called five poisons that may lead to continuous re-
birth and must therefore be overcome. In Hinduism, the avoidance of envy is a yama, an 
advised restraint, which should be followed. As regards Christianity, Schoeck (1966) points 
out the following:  
The ethic taught by the New Testament sought to secure differentiated human 
existence  in  a  world  full  of  envious  people  and  unlikely  to  evolve  into  a 
society of equals … In the West, the historical achievement of this Christian 
ethic  is  to  have  encouraged  and  protected,  if  not  to  have  been  actually 
responsible for the extent of, the exercise of human creative powers through 
the control of envy. (pp. 159-160)  
 
We  can  therefore  expect  that  positional  concerns  may  not  affect  people’s  trust  in 
churches  and  religious  organization  because  these  provide  mechanisms  for  catalysing  the   16   
feeling of envy. In addition, all religions have elaborated a sanctioning system that reinforces 
social  values,  providing  support  for  toleration  of  inequality  and  legitimizing  noticeable 
differences in individual circumstances in the interest of social peace. These observations lead 
to our fourth hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 4: The level of trust in churches and religious organizations should not be 
affected by relative income concerns.  
 
Social comparisons may also have an impact on willingness to comply with social and 
legal norms; for example, relative income position may affect willingness to pay taxes (tax 
morale).  As  the  study  by  Frey  and  Torgler  (2007),  using  survey  data  for  30  European 
countries, suggests, taxpayers observe the pro-social, complying behaviour of other taxpayers 
and pay their taxes conditionally.
3 The extent to which others also contribute triggers greater 
or less cooperation and systematically influences an individual’s own willingness to comply. 
As a consequence, we may also observe social comparison mechanisms related to the relative 
income position for compliance with social norms. A relative disadvantage may lead to a 
lower tax morale or benefit morale by creating dissatisfaction and a sense of distress over the 
discrepancy  between  the  actual  and  the  aspired-to  financial  situation.  In  such  a  scenario, 
cheating the government by not paying taxes and claiming unjustified government benefits 
might  serve  as  means  for  an  ‘illegal’  income  redistribution  by  the  socially  deprived.
4  In 
general, there is evidence that such positional distress can cause a decrease in the level of tax 
morale (see Torgler, 2006a, 2007). Similarly, Torgler et al. (2006) show empirically that the 
larger the income differences within a German soccer team, the worse the performance (i.e., 
effort to comply) of the single players. What about the compliance with criminal and traffic 
law?  If,  as  previous  observations  suggest,  we  can  expect  social  capital  to  be  negatively 
affected by a disadvantage in relative income position, the same should be observed for a   17   
general compliance with law, even if the infringer is a close friend. Thus, our fifth hypothesis 
is as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Relative income concerns are deleterious to individuals’ willingness to 
obey the law and comply with norms.  
 
Lastly, voluntary participation in political organizations and activities might be caused by an 
incentive to either express personal preferences or even attempt to change the societal income 
structure via exerting influence on political institutions. Similarly, an individual may become 
involved  in  institutions  that  correct  or  deal  with  relative  social  disadvantages  through 
charitable (e.g. helping the sick, elderly or poor) or religious and church-related activities, 
even without benefiting directly from them. Individuals’ with a disadvantage in the relative 
income may try to employ civic engagement as a personal redistribution device likewise. 
Moreover, some economic models of volunteering assume that people with a high value of 
time face higher opportunity costs and should be less likely to volunteer (Freeman, 1997). 
Based on these thoughts, we develop our final hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 6: Individuals’ active participation in voluntary activities is affected by 
their relative income position. More specifically, positional concerns may increase the 
participation in voluntary charity and church work as well as involvement in political 
organizations. 
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III. DATA  
 
This  analysis  uses  a  cross  section  of  individual  data  from  the  1998  ISSP  survey,  which 
contains various questions related to four dimensions of social capital – trust between people 
and people’s trust in social institutions, compliance with norms and creation of networks 
through  civic  engagement.  In  addition,  we  include  the  happiness  question  as  a  generic 
measure of social capital. The ISSP survey is a programme of cross-national collaboration on 
representative surveys covering a wide range of topics for social science research. As the 
survey  is  conducted  in  several  countries,  comparative  data  on  values  and  belief  systems 
among  people  of  different  cultural  backgrounds  can  be  investigated.  Inclusion  of  a  large 
number  of  countries  in  a  multivariate  cross-national  analysis  allows  to  observe  robust, 
culturally  and  socially  independent  tendencies,  while  in  the  available  literature  based  on 
individual-level  data  so  far  only  single  countries  have  been  investigated.  The  categorical 
dependent variables have been recoded so that higher values correspond to higher levels of 
social  capital.  Important  to  our  analysis  is  the  fact  that  this  dataset  not  only  covers 
approximately 24,000 observations from 26 countries but provides precise information on 
personal income, our variable of interest. Moreover, this data set allows to control for a wide 
array of additional socio-demographic factors usually employed in multivariate analyses of 
issues  such  as  tax  morale,  health  status  or  life  satisfaction  (see,  e.g.,  Dorn  et  al.,  2007; 
Torgler, 2007). To make disposable income comparable across persons, equivalent income is 
calculated based on the modified OECD equivalence scale (Van Doorslaer and Masseria, 
2004). Most important, the individual income is expressed as the individual’s share in the 
benchmark income (yis / ys). The latter transformation makes individual income independent 
from national macroeconomic conditions and avoids comparison of absolute income levels 
across  countries.  National  median  income  is  computed  as  the  median  of  the  personal 
equivalence income observed in one country, and analogously, as the regional median income   19   
for regions. If fewer than 30 observations exist for one region, larger entities are formed for 
statistical inference.  
Descriptive  statistics for  these  variables  are  reported  in  Tables  A1  and  A2  of  the 
Appendix. Taking a look at (absolute) income differences, means and standard deviations are 
smaller for incomes below the national or regional median than for those above. Moreover, 
regional median income is lower than the median across countries, indicating that an unequal 
distribution of incomes within countries is present. The descriptive statistics in Table A1 also 
show that there are as many men as women in our sample, and reports that individuals below 
50 years and married persons form the majority groups in our sample. Moreover, although the 
average  educational  level  is  quite  high,  a  strong  variation  is  observed.  Regarding 
denominations,  most  interviewees  are  either  Protestants,  Catholics  or  are  not  part  of  a 
particular religion denomination. In our sample, more interviewees live in urban areas, and 
the majority is either employed, or, to a lesser extent, retired. The descriptive statistics in 
Table A2 indicates that most social capital indicators are measured on a 4- or 5- point scale. 
Happiness, the three compliance measures tax morale, government benefit morale and, ‘rights 
of friend to wrongful testimony’, as well as confidence in institutions show the highest means 
in the sample, taking into account that the underlying scales are not perfectly comparable. 
However, on average, engagement in voluntary activities, particularly engagement in politics, 
provides  the  lowest  values.  In  addition,  the  values  of  the  standard  deviations  differ 
considerably when they are assessed based on the size of the differing scales or the according 
sample means.   
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IV. MODEL AND METHODOLOGY 
 
In  this  (here  simplified)  cross-sectional  model,  we  regard  the  individual  i’s  self-report 
contribution to social capital in country s (Yis) as a function of the relative income position of 
that  individual  in  country  (region)  s  (Zis)  and  a  vector  of  additional  individual  control 
variables (Vis). National or regional fixed effects (Fs) and error term (εis) complete this model.  
 
    Yis = β1Zis + β2Vis + Fs + εis                    (1) 
 
To ensure comparability of the estimation results, computation for the various regressands 
employs the identical set of control variables (Vis). Our variable of interest, relative income 
position (Zis), is measured as the difference between an individual’s income and the reference 
group income, observed at the aggregate level. In general, using an aggregate reference level 
is advantageous in that it is exogenously given for the single individual. The vector of control 
variables  at  the  individual  level  (Vis)  is  based  on  previous  empirical  literature  on  life 
satisfaction or social capital (e.g., Dorn et al., 2007, Torgler, 2007). It includes gender, age, 
education,  occupational  status,  marital  status,  religious  denominations,  religiosity,  and  a 
dummy for living in an urbanized area. Tables A1–A2 in the Appendix provide a complete 
list of the dependent variables and the determinants. 
Important, but often neglected, control variables at the aggregate level are country’s 
cultural background, norms and institutions as well as its overall economic situation, that 
might be correlated with individual-level characteristics, particularly income situation, and 
equally influence the creation of social capital. The effects of these national characteristics are 
not directly included in the model, but captured by country or region fixed effects, which also 
‘absorb’ the reference group’s income level.    21   
Given the categorical nature of our dependent variable, equation (1) is estimated with 
a weighted ordered probit estimation method; application of weights makes the estimation 
results  representative  for  the  corresponding  national  population.
5  For  each  regression  we 
report the McFadden R2 that ranges between 0 and 1.
6 
Because any differences resulting from variations in the definition of reference income 
might be interesting, we investigate the relationship between the relative income position and 
social  capital employing  a  regional and  national  income  benchmark  model.
7  As  outlined 
above,  the  median  income  of  the  reference  group  seems  intuitively  appealing  for  social 
comparison, particularly in countries in which income is very unequally distributed.
8    
  The regional approach takes into account that income levels are not equally distributed 
within countries and people are more likely to compare their societal position with that of 
close  neighbours  than  with  the  rest  of  the  world  (Festinger,  1954;  Stouffer,  1949).  As  a 
consequence, the effect of positional concerns should be more pronounced when observed at 
the  regional  level.  As  counterargument,  one  can  state  that  migration  incentives  to  move 
between  regions  with  different  general  levels  of  wealth  should  reduce  the  emergence  of 
positional concerns at the regional level.
9 In addition, because the estimated coefficients only 
indicate the direction of the effect and not its magnitude, we also compute marginal effects for 
the highest level of social capital.  
It can be argued that income comparisons are asymmetric (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005; 
Duesenberry,  1949;  Holländer,  2001;  Frank,  1985).  Consequently,  the  possibility  of  an 
asymmetric  effect  is  taken  into  account  through  differentiating  between  the  impact  for 
‘poorer’ persons from the influence for ‘richer’ persons, similarly to the approach taken by 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005, p.1004).
10 Moreover, we might expect a decreasing marginal utility 
of income for richer, but not poorer, individuals, which we take into account by inclusion of 
the  squared  terms  of  the  income  differences.  Thus,  the  vector  Zis  contains  the  following 
income variables:   22   
  ‘poorer’ = (ys – yis)/ys, if yis < ys and 0 otherwise, 
‘richer’ = (yis – ys)/ys if yis ≥ ys, and 0 otherwise, 
  ‘poorer’-squared = ‘poorer’^2,  
  ‘richer’-squared = ‘richer’^2. 
Econometrically, this model specification has the advantage that it leaves the functional form 
of  the  relation  between  relative  income  and  social  capital  open,  in contrast  to  when  one 
assumes a linear or log-linear form, as often encountered in happiness studies (e.g. Ferrer-i-
Carbonell, 2005). High correlation between the relative income variable and its squared term 
(rho = 0.8 and higher), however, might disguise a truly decisive impact of any of them. Wald-
tests of the joint significance of the income distance and its squared term aim to distinguish 
these  cases  from  those  where  they  exert,  both  individually  and  jointly,  an  insignificant 
impact.
11 The test results are included in the bottom line of the output tables. In addition, we 
also estimate a simpler version of the model that excludes the squared terms, assuming that 
social capital is a linear function of relative income.   
Due to the  cross-sectional nature  of our data, reversed causality and measurement 
error might bias the estimated coefficients. In particular, social capital might influence an 
individual’s earnings and therefore potentially her relative income position. Knack and Keefer 
(1997),  for  example,  provide  evidence  at  the  macro  level  that  trust  can  affect  growth. 
Moreover, other omitted factors might drive both professional career and the perception of 
social capital in society likewise.
12 Like in many other cross-sectional happiness studies using 
individual data, a lack of adequate exogenous variables prevents the use of an instrumental 
variables  approach.  Table  A4  of  the  Appendix  displays  the  estimation  outcomes  for  all 
variables in our model for the happiness question, our most generic measure of social capital, 
for  both  the  national  and  regional  benchmark  model.  All  included  individual-level 
determinants are significant at the 1 or 5 percent level, and if not individually, then jointly 
with covariates relating to the same background factor (e.g. denomination).    23   
Before  we  turn  to  the  estimation  results,  we  present  some  preliminary  correlation 
analyses in order to make the reader more familiar with the data. Table A3 displays weighted 
averages at the country-level of four most prominent and known social capital variables. The 
highest average happiness levels are reported in mostly English – and Germanic-speaking 
countries (with the exception of Germany), while the highest average generalized trust scores 
are  observed  in  Northern  Europe  (see  Knack  and  Keefer,  1997).  In  contrast,  average 
confidence in parliament appears quite evenly distributed across geographical and cultural 
regions, with two transition countries and one Asian country among the upper third group. 
Also the distribution of average tax morale across countries does not follow commonplace 
stereotypes,  as  the  two  highest  levels  are  observed  for  Japan  and  Spain.  Contrary  to 
expectations, Switzerland, Austria, and Germany are found in the lower bottom of the tax 
morale distribution. As regards the average frequency of engagement in charity organizations, 
there seems to be an overrepresentation of English and Nordic language speaking countries in 
the upper tail. These variations in country-level averages of social capital suggest that we 
don’t  observe  the  existence  of  an  exhaustive  set  of  common  institutional  or  cultural 
background factors that would sufficiently explain these results, making our chosen fixed 
effects approach even more important as controlling for all potential aggregate factors would 
not be realizable.  
At  the  individual  level,  Spearman’s  rank  correlation  coefficients  among  the  four 
representative social capital variables and happiness show low correlations, not exceeding 
0.22 (not reported). Equally, the full correlation matrix shows quite low correlations among 
the  fourteen  measures,  with  only  a  few  exceeding  the  value  of  0.4.
13  The  relatively  low 
correlation  among  the  social  capital  variables  suggests  that  they  measure  distinct  facets, 
justifying their separate analysis. Regional and national income is highly correlated (rho = 
0.96), as are regional and national income differences  (overall:  0.92, positive ones:  0.94,   24   
negative  ones: 0.86). These extremely  high correlations suggest  that the regional  and the 
national benchmark approaches can be expected to yield similar outcomes.   
   
 
V. ESTIMATION RESULTS  
 
Tables 1, 3, 5, 7 and 1a, 3a, 5a, and 7a report the results for the case in which the national 
median income level serves as an individual’s benchmark for evaluating his or her relative 
income position, while Tables 2, 4, 6, 8 and 2a, 4a, 6a and 8a display the outcomes for the 
corresponding regional median income. The upper tables present the results when the most 
flexible functional form is assumed, while the tables at the bottom of each page (denoted with 
‘a’)  present  the  outcomes  of  the  model  based  on  an  entirely  linear  relation.  Overall,  the 
Pseudo R2 of 0.06 or higher indicates for all measures of social capital (except for the tax 
morale regressions) a good fit of the model to the data. Moreover, the values of the Pseudo R2 
suggest that estimation of the simpler model (Tables 1a to 8a) is qualitatively more or less 
equivalent to assuming a more flexible functional form (Tables 1 to 8), at least in terms of this 
specific measure. Although we allow for non-linearity in the effects of positive and negative 
income distances, the following discussion focuses on the direction of influence of positional 




The first dependent variable is our generic measure of social capital, namely ‘happiness’ (see 
Tables 1 to 2a). It can be argued that a higher level of social trust, better networks and well-
targeted  government  activities  that  raise  confidence  in  its  institutions  might  work  as 
transmission channels for citizen well-being. This dependent variable measures respondents’   25   
happiness  in  four  categories,  with  the  highest  category  indicating  the  highest  level  of 
subjective well-being.
14 The results reveal that individual well-being not only declines with a 
growing income distance for those below the median income level, but also, and equally 
significantly,  increases  with  growing  positive  income  distances  for  those  above  the 
benchmark income. Thus, for the group below the median income positional concerns seem to 
be detrimental to  subjective  well-being.  The  marginal  effects are relatively  high for  both 
income distances, but indicate a stronger impact in absolute terms of being poorer than of 
being richer, with a probability of reporting the highest happiness level of -16.9 and 1.7 
percentage  points,  respectively.  The  size  of  the  marginal  effect  for  ‘being  poorer’  is  the 
largest  among  all  the  investigated  measures  of  social  capital,  which  indicates  that  our 
benchmark variable, happiness, provides one of the strongest position concern effects. For 
both positive and negative relative income the significant coefficients of the squared terms 
reveal the presence of non-linear effects.
15 Thus, the results indicate that the relative income 
position is important for the well-being of richer and poorer persons likewise and that position 
concerns are deleterious to subjective well-being, which is in line with our hypothesis 1 and 
several previous findings in the happiness literature.  
Table 1a displays the estimation results for the linear specification. The findings are 
consistent as both disadvantage and advantage in the relative income position affect the level 
of life satisfaction in the expected direction, lending support to hypothesis 1. Although the 
marginal effects of relative income appear to be somewhat smaller (-0.113 compared to  
-0.169 and 0.015 compared to 0.017, respectively), we still observe being poorer to be more 
detrimental by far than being richer to be conducive to happiness, in absolute terms.  
Table 2 and 2a provide the results using the regional median level of earning as a 
reference  level.  As can be seen, the results are qualitatively similar and lead  to identical 
conclusions. Thus, overall, these findings are consistent with the first hypothesis that having a 
disadvantage in the relative income position is deleterious to one’s happiness.    26   
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The next set of regressands relates to generalized trust, the dimension of social capital that 
measures whether respondents believe that people in general can be trusted and how they 
evaluate the general level of fairness in society. The first question, asks respondents to assess 
the  general  degree  of  other  people’s  fairness  towards  themselves.
16  A  low  value  for  the 
categorical regressand reflects the view that ‘people take advantage all the time’, whereas the 
highest value indicates the answer ‘people are fair all the time’. At first sight, the results in 
Table 1 indicate there does not appear to exist any linkage between relative income position 
and the level of perceived fairness: the coefficients of almost all income distance variables are 
not  significant  at  conventional  levels,  except  for  the  coefficient  on  the  squared  positive 
difference. Although this finding might indicate a potential effect for those with an income 
above the national median, the Wald-test of the joint significance of the two positive income 
distance variables does not support this view. In contrast, the Wald-test on the two negative 
income distance variables  shows that relative income might  matter  for poorer individuals 
(rejection at the 1 percent level of significance). In support of hypothesis 2, the sign of the 
income distance below the national median income is negative, with a substantial marginal 
effect (-3.4 percentage points). Thus, generalized trust  seems to  decrease with a  growing 
distance of one’s earnings to the reference income. This conjecture is corroborated when a 
simpler linear model is estimated (see Table 1a). In this model, poorer individuals perceive 
others  as  acting  less  fairly  the  relatively  more  disadvantaged  they  are;  in  other  words,   27   
positional concerns that might lead to envy appear to destroy social trust. As conjectured 
before, for positive income differences, no relative income effect is observable. Thus, for 
individuals’ contribution to social trust an asymmetric income effect is detected. The results 
using the regional median income benchmark model in Table 2 and 2a mirror our previous 
outcomes perfectly,
17 lending support to hypothesis 2 for the situation in which individuals 
have a disadvantage in the relative income position.    
The  second  question  asks  whether  people  can  generally  be  trusted  or  whether 
individuals  should  be  careful.
18  Again,  the  lowest  category  indicates  a  low  level  of 
generalized  trust  (see  also  Table  1).  Based  on  the  significance  levels  of  the  individual 
coefficients and the outcomes of the Wald-tests, both, negative and positive income distances, 
appear  decisive  for  the  trust  level,  with  influences  in  the  expected  direction.  While  an 
improved relative income position is conducive to trust, positional concerns, caused by a 
growing distance between one’s own income and the reference group, are deleterious. This 
finding mirrors closely the result for the happiness variable and supports the predicted impact 
of positional concerns for social trust (hypothesis 2). That is, the more concerned people are 
with their relative income position, the less they regard their environment as trustworthy. 
However, although the direction of the effect appears symmetric, the marginal effects indicate 
that the effect is substantially (almost 40 times) more influential for persons below the median 
income than for those above, both in terms of statistical significance and magnitude (-0.038 
compared  to  0.001).  Moreover,  non-linearity  in  the  income  effects  is  present,  as  the 
significant estimates of the squared income terms indicate.
19 In contrast, estimation of the 
simple  model  corroborates  the  finding  for  negative  income  distances  but  disguises  the 
significant impact of positive income differences, rendering its coefficient insignificant (see 
Table  1a).  Clearly,  assuming  a  linear  function  potentially  misrepresents  the  true  relation 
between income and generalized trust, yielding distorted estimation outcomes. Again, Table 2 
and 2a show that defining the benchmark at the regional level we find supportive and less   28   
ambiguous  results  for  the  more  flexible  model  specification,  now  clearly  rendering  the 
coefficients  of  both  income  distances  significant.
20  Again,  we  observe  that  the  marginal 
impact is larger, in absolute terms, for persons with an income below the regional median 
than for those above, and the simple model equally shows that relative income matters for 
poorer individuals only (see Table 2a).  
Overall,  the  results  for  the  two  generalized  trust  variables  clearly  show  that  a 
disadvantage in the relative income position generates positional concerns that are destructive 
for an individual’s contribution to this dimension of social capital. On the other hand, persons 
who are better off than their reference group develop more trust in their social environment. 
The  effects  are  stronger  when  the  income  difference  is  negative,  rather  than  when  it  is 
positive, and equally when the benchmark is at the national level rather than at the regional. 
This finding lends strong support to hypothesis 2.  
 
 
Trust in Institutions 
The third set of dependent variables measures the confidence in institutions – specifically, the 
parliament, courts, business and the church – that represents the quality of the relationship 
between government and the respondent (see Tables 3 to 4a). Again, higher values for these 
variables indicate a higher level of vertical trust.
21 
Confidence in parliament, displayed in Table 3, is solely influenced by the relative 
income position when the income is below the national median income level (at the 1 percent 
of significance), exerting a marginal effect of -1.6 percentage points). In contrast, having an 
income higher than the reference group does not appear to affect one’s confidence in the 
national legislature, showing therefore an asymmetric impact. The estimation results equally 
reveal non-linearity of the relative income effect for ‘poorer’ persons. Positional concerns 
appear again detrimental to this dimension of social capital when the simpler specification is   29   
employed (at the 1 percent level), while richer individuals’ confidence level does not appear 
affected. The estimation outcomes of the regional income model are perfectly consistent with 
the national income model. This income effect, although asymmetric, supports hypothesis 3 
that  the  relative  income  matters  and  gives  rise  to  the  interpretation  that  (non-beneficial) 
changes  in  the  short-term  determinants  of  one’s  social  position  by  the  legislature  are 
deleterious to an individual’s trust relation with the government.  
Interestingly, we observe a similar asymmetric pattern when investigating confidence 
in courts and the legal system. The results of both, the simpler and the more flexible model, 
reveal that – for incomes below the median – confidence in courts is negatively related to the 
relative income position: the relatively poorer the individuals, the less they trust country’s 
justice system (at the 1 percent significance level). While the coefficient estimate for the 
squared negative income distance indicates the presence of a non-linear income effect for the 
disadvantaged, the Wald-test confirms the non-decisiveness for the positive relative income 
distances.  Qualitatively  identical  observations  are  made  when  using  the  regional  median 
income (Tables 4 and 4a). Overall, the model for confidence in courts mirrors the previous 
results using confidence in the parliament as dependent variable perfectly. Nevertheless, it is 
interesting  to  note  that the  marginal effects  are  twice  as  high  as  those  for  confidence  in 
parliament.  Clearly,  positional  concerns  that  destroy  public  trust  in  institutions  are  more 
severe for those institutions that presumably act more independently and more objectively 
than those institutions that are more subject to political business and re-election cycles, such 
as the national parliament. These gaps in marginal effects for the two institutions persist when 
the regional income is used in place of the national income (-2.9 compared to -1.7 percentage 
points).  
The level of expressed ‘confidence in business and industry’ is significantly altered by 
the distance change between individual income and national benchmark income (on either 
side of the median income), showing support for hypothesis 3. However, again, the sizes of   30   
the marginal effects imply a certain asymmetry, as the trust-generating effect of an increase in 
positive distances is almost 20 times lower in absolute terms than the destructive influence of 
a rise of negative income differences (-1.9 percentage points compared to 0.1 percentage 
points). These main findings are corroborated by the regression outcomes for the simpler 
specification in Table 3a and when the reference income is calculated at the regional level 
(see Tables 4 and 4a). Qualitatively, the impact of a having a disadvantage in the relative 
income position is comparable to the one observed for the other institutional trust variables, 
while a trust generating effect of a positive income distance is only yielded for this facet of 
social capital. Clearly, these findings lend strong support to hypothesis 3.  
Turning  to  the  empirical  test  of  hypothesis  4,  the  results  are  in  line  with  our 
expectations that confidence in churches and religious organizations is completely unrelated 
to any income distance (either negative or positive). This result is supported by the two Wald-
tests  of  the  joint  significance  (despite  the  significance  of  the  squared  positive  income 
distance).  Imposing  a  linear  functional form  on  the  linkage  between  relative  income and 
social capital corroborates that having an advantage in the relative income position does not 
affect self-report confidence in churches. However, it also renders the coefficient on ‘poorer’ 
significant,  implying  that  persons  with  an  income  disadvantage  express  higher  levels  of 
confidence in this institution. In contrast, when using the regional benchmark income, while 
the outcomes of the more flexible specification are well mirrored (particularly by the Wald-
tests),  the  positional  income  effect  for  poorer  persons  in  the  simpler  model  cannot  be 
corroborated. Thus, preferring the model where a more flexible functional form of the income 
effect is assumed, we conclude that there is no relative income effect, possibly reflecting the 
(presumably) non-profit nature of this institution. 
In sum, trust in the parliament, courts, and business appear sensitive to changes in a 
disadvantage in the relative income position. On the other hand, confidence in churches is not 
affected by income distances.   31   
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Compliance with Social Norms 
The next dimension of social capital, compliance with norms, is measured by tax morale, 
government  benefit  morale  and  the  subjective  right  of  a  friend  to  unlawful  testimony  as 
protection against state prosecution (Tables 5 to 6a).  
The first regressand, the ‘tax morale’ measure, relates to the respondent’s view on 
whether it is morally wrong to report income taxes incorrectly.
22 The lowest category reflects 
the answer “not wrong”, while the highest category indicates “seriously wrong”. While the 
estimates show that a negative income distance has no impact on tax morale, the willingness 
to pay taxes appears to decrease with a growing positive distance between the individual’s 
income  and  the  national  median  benchmark  level  at an  increasing  rate.  These  estimation 
outcomes indicate an asymmetric income effect. Furthermore, they also contrast our previous 
findings in this paper with respect to the direction of influence of income advantages. The 
results of the simpler model (with no squared terms), reported in Table 5a, corroborate our 
previous finding that an increase in the positive income distance lowers the propensity to pay 
taxes  honestly,  as  indicated  by  the  negative  sign.  Thus,  positional  income  effects  for 
individuals above the median income are probably present, although with a relatively small 
marginal impact (-0.5 percentage points in the linear model).  
However, using regional median income as benchmark, no significant influences of 
any income variable are observable. Both the Wald-tests and the regression assuming a linear 
function  corroborate  this  finding.  In  consequence,  preferring  the  regional  model  over  the   32   
national, the tendency is that the level of tax morale does not seem to depend on the relative 
income position at all.
23. Previous empirical studies of tax morale or tax compliance have 
yielded no robust relationship between levels of absolute income and tax morale, (see, e.g., 
Torgler, 2007), confirming our own findings.
24 However, the non-decisiveness of absolute or 
relative  income  position  for  a  person’s  tax  morale  does  not  necessarily  mean  that  other 
measures partly relating to one’s financial situation do not matter (see Torgler, 2007). More 
specifically, the question remains whether a relative income advantage is correlated with a tax 
morale  raising  financial  satisfaction,  thus  indirectly  contributing  to  social  capital,  that 
potentially compensates a direct compliance decreasing impact of income, rendering its total 
influence insignificant. In sum we can conclude that hypothesis 5 is rather rejected when 
looking at tax morale.  
Contrasting results are obtained in the case of the second measure for compliance with 
social norms – namely whether it is morally wrong to give incorrect information to obtain 
government  benefits
25.  For  this  regressand,  we  observe  that  acceptance  of  cheating  the 
government increases (non-linearly) with a worsened relative income position as measured by 
the growing negative income distance form the national median and the joint significance of 
the negative income variables at the 1 percent level (Table 5). The impact of destructive 
positional concerns is with -12.9 percentage points quite sizeable and the direction of its 
influence is in line with hypothesis 5. No income position effect, however, is observed for 
those who are better off than the median person in society. The findings for the simple model 
corroborate the previous finding showing a strong deleterious influence of positional concerns 
for those below the median income (significant at the 1 percent level), but not for those above 
(Table 5a).   
However, the outcome for the regressand ’benefit morale’ when the regional median 
income is employed reveals a more differentiated picture (see Table 6 and 6a). While the 
significant  estimates  of  being  ‘poorer’  lead  to  conclusions  supporting  hypothesis  5,   33   
contrasting findings are obtained for positive income differences. The coefficient estimates 
for  the  positive  income  distances  suggest  that  persons  with  an  income  advantage  have  a 
higher  propensity  to  comply  with  social  norms,  also  being  non-linear  in  nature.  As  for 
previous measures of social capital, the marginal effects for ‘poorer’ persons exceed those 
observed for ‘richer’ persons by far in absolute terms (-12.5 percentage points compared with 
0.8 percentage points). However, the Wald-test cannot reject the null hypothesis that both 
positive income distance variables are jointly insignificant. This conclusion is then supported 
by the results of the simple linear model as only positional concerns of the deprived appear 
decisive, being in line with hypothesis 5. Overall, our results reveal that a relative income 
disadvantage  is  detrimental  to  the  willingness  to  comply  with  norms,  while  income 
advantages tend not to affect this facet of social capital. Consequently, the tendency is not to 
reject hypothesis 5, claiming that the relative income affects willingness to be honest.  
In the case of the regressand for the third measure of compliance with social norm – 
whether close friends have the right to you giving wrongful testimony aimed at lowering their 
punishment – the lowest category reflects the answer “he has a definite right” and the highest, 
“he has no right”.
26 Again, the highest category corresponds with the highest level of social 
capital in terms of obeisance to the law.  
Interestingly, the results for the simple and the flexible national benchmark model 
suggest that positional concerns  do not  matter  for compliance  with norms  relating  to the 
criminal code enacted by the national legislature (Tables 5 and 5a). In other words, both 
financially advantaged and disadvantaged persons do not substantially differ in their social 
attitudes in that respect. Furthermore, employing the regional income model, all regressions 
equally support the view that compliance to norms stipulated in the criminal code does not 
depend  on  individuals'  relative  income  position  (Tables  6  and  6a).  Hence,  the  overall 
tendency is to reject hypothesis 5 for social capital measured by the unwillingness to give 
wrongful testimony.    34   
 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Tables 5, 5a, 6, and 6a about here 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Overall, the results obtained for the social norm ‘compliance’ are very mixed. While 
the findings for the two measures ‘tax morale’ and ‘giving wrongful testimony’ suggest that 
relative income does not matter, thus rejecting hypothesis 5, the results for ‘benefit morale’ 
strongly support the deleterious impact of positional concerns driven by relative income. It 
might well be that cheating the government for obtaining payments is most closely linked to 
improving  one’s  financial  situation  through  accessible  means.  Instead,  the  willingness  to 
evade  taxes  may  well  depend  stronger  on  individuals’  occupation  (opportunity  set),  the 
structure of the tax system (progression, captured by the fixed effects), and the risk aversion 
that affects their perceptions of deterrence (audit probability and fine rate). As regards the 
obeisance  to  the  (criminal)  law,  individuals’  relative  income  position  is  less  likely  to  be 
connected to the situation of giving wrongful testimony to finally determine her propensity. 
Note also the comparatively low Pseudo R2 values particularly for the tax morale regression 
(0.0398), the lowest of all estimated models. In sum, the overall tendency is rather to reject 




The last set of regressands is linked to social networks that form a decisive part of social 
capital.  These  are  measured  particularly  by  the  frequency  of  the  interviewee’s  voluntary 
participation in politics, charitable activities, religious activities and other kinds of voluntary   35   
work. Again, a higher value for the dependent variable reflects more frequent involvement in 
such activities.
27 
The  regression  results  show  no  influence  of  the  relative  income  position  on  the 
propensity to engage in voluntary work in political activities on either side of the benchmark 
level. This finding is supported by both the Wald-tests and the estimation results for the 
simple  model.  Using  the  regional  median  income  as  benchmark  level  the  model  yields 
qualitatively identical results. Thus, in contrast to our expectations, engagement in politics is 
not affected by the relative income position, rejecting hypothesis 6.  
Voluntary  work  in  charity  organizations  such  as  the  Red  Cross  and  the  Salvation 
Army appears to increase with relative income distance of those who are relatively better off 
than  the  median  person  in  society,  while  the  estimates  for  ‘poorer’  persons  suggest  that 
positional concerns do not matter. However, as the Wald-test rejects the null hypothesis of 
joint insignificance of the negative income variables at the 5 percent level, for poorer persons, 
a growing income distance seems to trigger a lower propensity to become socially active. For 
both groups non-linear effects appear present. For ‘richer’ persons the propensity to engage 
voluntarily increases with income distance at a decreasing rate, while for ‘poorer’ positional 
concerns  affect  civic  engagement  at  an  increasing  rate.  These  estimation  results  are 
corroborated and even stronger by corresponding findings for the model using the regional 
median income as the reference point. Thus, that positional concerns appear to lower the 
frequency of social engagement in charity organisations contradicts hypothesis 6. Although it 
should be noted that the marginal effects with -0.010 (-.002, respectively) are not very high 
for negative income distances, they are still dominating those for having an income advantage 
(.003 and .004, respectively). In the simple model, the result for the engagement rising impact 
of a positive income distances is supported (see Tables 7a and 8a). However, for persons 
below the regional median income, a positive effect becomes dominant that contrasts the 
regressions outcomes for the more flexible functional form (Table 8).
28 Following previously   36   
developed arguments, however, misspecification of the true functional form might well bias 
the coefficients in the linear specification. In sum, these first results suggest that hypothesis 6 
has to be rejected.  
Turning to religious activities in Table 7 and 7a (national median income benchmark 
model), at first sight, positional concerns do not to appear to affect any individual’s frequency 
of  participation.
29  This  result  is  supported  when  using  the  simpler  model  specification. 
Estimating  the  model  using  the  regional  median  income,  however,  the  Wald-test  on  the 
negative  income  variables  suggests  that  positional  effects  are  present  for  poorer  persons 
(rejection of nonsignificance at the 5 percent level). The positive coefficient of the negative 
income  distance  suggests  a  stronger  involvement  in  activities  relating  to  religion 
organizations when the relative income disadvantage increases, at an increasing rate. Indeed, 
the estimation outcome of the simple model corroborates this effect (coefficient ‘poorer’ is 
significant at the 1 percent level, Table 8a).
30 Thus, here there is evidence that is in support of 
hypothesis 6.  
Finally, the frequency of activities in other kinds of voluntary works kinds seems not 
be affected by the relative income position, when the national median income is employed as 
reference level, as both the flexible and the simple model suggest (see Table 7 and 7a). In 
contrast, when  using the regional  median income, the estimation  results with the flexible 
model specification indicate that the relative income effects is asymmetric: for richer persons 
the propensity to get engaged in other organizations increases with relative income (at the 5 
percent level), with a 0.2 percentage point increase in the probability to report the highest 
level of engagement when relative income rises by 1 percentage point. Although the Wald-
test suggests that the effect is rather linear, a similar, albeit weaker result is obtained when 
estimating the simple model (significant at the 10 percent level). Thus, relative income effects 
of the more affluent appear, again, conducive to the social engagement dimension of social 
capital, measured by the frequency of voluntary work for 'other organizations'. In contrast,   37   
positional concerns of those individuals with an income below the benchmark do not appear 
to affect their civic engagement in ‘other organisations’, contradicting hypothesis 6.  
Overall, for social engagement in political, charity, religious, or other organisations, 
the overall tendency is to reject hypothesis 6 that stated that positional concerns increase the 
propensity of civic engagement. In our estimation results, a relative income effect becomes 
more visible when the regional median income rather than the national income level is used as 
the  benchmark.  Under  both  benchmark  specifications,  political  activities  appear 
symmetrically not influenced by relative income, while engagement in charity, religious, and 
other organizations appear affected by the relative income position. Particularly, for more 
affluent  individuals  we  observe  stronger  involvement  in  civic  engagement  in  ‘other’  and 
‘charity’ organizations. These results are in line with some previous studies that have shown 
that a more privileged social status is often correlated with higher levels of voluntarism and 
civic participation (for an overview see Hwang et al., 2005).  
In contrast, positional concerns of the deprived reduce frequency of participating in 
charity organizations while increasing that in religion organizations. These results might well 
indicate that engagement in politics is more driven by ideological positions and world views 
rather than individuals’ financial situation, while the one-dimensional focus of charity and 
other organisation on ‘social/re-distributional’ activities provides additional, potentially non-
financial benefits for richer people (e.g. gains in reputation).  
 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
Tables 7, 7a, 8, and 8a about here 
---------------------------------------------------------- 
 
In sum, looking at both benchmark models, we find in many cases that, in line with 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2005), income comparisons are not symmetric and any income effect is   38   
not per se linear. Only in a few cases the propensity of richer persons to contribute to social 
capital increases with relative income, while the deleterious effect of positional concerns is 
revealed for about two thirds of the chosen facets of social capital (see also Table 9). In 
addition,  we  observe  larger  marginal  effects  (in  absolute  values)  for  positional  concerns, 
namely  when  an  individual’s  income  is  below  the  benchmark  income,  than  for  income 
advantages for those above the benchmark income, with the first being up to 40 times larger 
than the latter in absolute values. Moreover, the findings using two different reference groups 
are robust and consistent: the estimation outcome does not change substantially no matter 
whether regional or national income variables are employed. For all social capital dimensions, 
the direction of impact is not affected by the choice of benchmark model. Differences do 
emerge, however, with respect to the marginal impact, which in most cases appears larger 
when the national level is employed as the reference point, while significance levels are often 
higher when using the regional model. Table 9 provides a concise overview of the findings of 
our empirical analysis.  
----------------------------------------- 





The importance of relative preferences is not a new concept. However, empirical evidence on 
the extent to which relative income position matters in different aspects of life is relatively 
rare.  Moreover,  most  empirical  studies  to  date  focus  mainly  on  its  impact  on  happiness. 
Nevertheless, some laboratory experiments have investigated the consequences of positional 
concerns  for  individuals’  social  behaviour  (see,  e.g.,  Kirchsteiger,  1994),  and  some  field 
studies  indicate  the  influence  of  relative  income  position  on,  for  example,  employer   39   
performance  or  employment  decisions  (see,  e.g.,  Torgler  et  al.,  2006;  Neumark  and 
Postlewaite, 1998).   
Paldam (2000) correctly points out that the social capital literature is a “new field, 
(but) suffering from a great lack of good, reliable data. Both time series and cross-country 
evidence are missing. In the meantime much speculation is going on” (p. 649). This current 
international cross-sectional study, using the rich ISSP 1998 international data covering 26 
countries and about 32,000 individuals, goes beyond several previous studies that focused on 
a single country. In our case we are able to abstract the impact of cultural, institutional and 
macroeconomic differences across countries, generating more reliable results. Thus, our paper 
contributes  to  the  social  capital  literature  in  general  and  the  cross-sectional  research  in 
particular by (1) analyzing the impact of relative income concerns on the creation of social 
capital  using  two  different  reference  groups  and  (2)  employing  13  different  questions  to 
measure social capital along four different dimensions: general trust between people, trust in 
institutions,  compliance  with  social  norms,  and  civic  engagement  in  form  of  voluntary 
activities.  In  addition,  we  also  include  self-reported  happiness,  which  serves  as  our 
benchmark measure.  
In general, we find empirical support that relative income matters (see Table 9). In 
most  cases,  we  find  the  coefficient  measuring  an  interviewee’s  relative  income  position 
statistically  significant,  with  considerable  marginal  effects.  Only  compliance  with  some 
specific norms (tax laws and criminal law), and voluntary work for political organizations 
appear to be free of positional concerns. Most particularly, confidence in churches appears 
unrelated to relative income. The strongest relative income effect is observable for happiness 
(with a marginal effect up to -16.9 percentage points), followed by compliance with social 
norms (not unjustifiably claiming government benefits) (with marginal effects up to -12.9), 
and, with a gap, generalized trust (marginal effect of -3.8). For these three measures, social 
capital or happiness  rises with  an improved  relative income  position and declines with a   40   
disadvantage in the relative income position. We also find substantial effects for confidence in 
the courts and the legal system, institutions which are less related than other variables to the 
current  politico-economic  process.  Obviously,  these  institutions,  unlike  the  national 
parliament and the private sector (business and industry) in which many citizens interact and 
work in their daily life, are more vulnerable to a positional effect. Less visible is a relative 
income effect for confidence in religious institutions the participation political organizations.  
We find the tendency that the relative income effect is not symmetric. The negative 
effect appears more sizeable for those individuals below the reference income by far than the 
positive impact for those people that are above the reference income. Moreover, the results 
are not affected by the chosen reference group (national versus regional income), although it 
should be noted that the quantitative effects of the relative income position is more sizeable 
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1  In  the  ancient  world,  Aristotle  (1924)  treated  envy  in  his  Rhetoric.  During  the  age  of  enlightenment, 
Immanuel Kant, in his 1785 Metaphysics of Morals, and Francis Bacon, in his 1625 Of Envy, discussed in 
detail the psychology of ingratitude and schadenfreude, provided well-developed definitions of envy and 
emphasized  the  importance  of  social  comparisons.  Other,  modern  classical  philosophers  such  as 
Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard, or Nietzsche have also stressed the function of envy in human society.   
2  Other contributions include Easterlin (1974, 1995, 2001), Clark and Oswald (1996), Watson et al., (1996), 
Groot  and  van  den  Brink  (1999),  Tsou  and  Liu  (2001),  McBride  (2001),  Lyubomirsky  (2001),  Stutzer 
(2004), and Kingdon and Knight (2004). 
3  More specifically, Frey and Torgler (2007) show that if taxpayers believe tax evasion to be common, their 
tax morale decreases. If, however, tax payers believe others to be honest, their tax morale increases. 
4  It can be argued that the effect might depend on the structure of the tax system, in particular on progression 
of the income tax schedule. A higher degree of progression may reduce the negative impact of a relative 
disadvantage, but also the positive effect of a relative advantage. In our model, country/region fixed effects 
will implicitly control for such an impact. 
5  Inclusion of fixed effects does not permit correction of within-group correlation through clustering at the 
aggregate level (Moulton, 1990).  
6  Based on the previous empirical happiness literature, we consider a Pseudo R2 of about 0.06 as good (e.g. 
Frey and Stutzer, 2000). 
7  Estimation with the regional and national subsistence income and a graphical representation of main income 
effects are reported in Fischer and Torgler (2006a, 2006b).  
8  The empirical happiness literature has rather employed the mean income as benchmark income (e.g. Ferrer-
i-Carbonell, 2005; Dorn et al, 2007). In our sample, however, the average is often located around the 70
th 
percentile of the income distribution, letting its role as comparison income appear unlikely.  
9  On the other hand, one might argue that modern communication and media caused an extension of one’s 
reference group now relating to the country’s median person rather to the regional median. 
10  In contrast, Dorn et al. (2007) assume asymmetry only with respect to the second derivative of the estimated 
happiness function, and a symmetric one with respect to its first.   
11   Although the Wald-test tests the null hypothesis that two (or more) coefficient estimates are jointly 
insignificant (H0: coeff(var1) = coeff(var2) = 0), we will henceforth term it ‘Wald-test of joint significance’ 
as often encountered in the empirical literature.    42 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
12  Causing reversed causality, engagement in social activities might be perceived as high productivity signal 
by the employer leading to higher wages. For example for an omitted third factor, optimist persons might 
view their peers as more trustworthy, on the one hand, and be more financially successful, on the other. 
13  All Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients are significant at the 1 percent level. 
14  Original question: “If you were to consider your life in general these days, how happy or unhappy would 
you say you are, on the whole”. Possible answers were “very happy”, fairly happy”, “not very happy” and 
“not at all happy”. 
15  For positive income differences we detect a decreasing marginal utility of income, a result in line with other 
life satisfaction studies that use national individual data (e.g. Dorn et al., 2005).  
16  Original question: “How often do you think that people would try to take advantage of you if they got the 
chance and how often would they try to be fair?”. Possible answers were “try to take advantage of me all of 
the time”, “try to take advantage most of the time”, “try to be fair most of the time” or “try to be fair almost 
all of the time”. 
17  Indeed, as the coefficient on the positive squared income variable becomes now insignificant in the more 
flexible specification and the Wald-test does not reject the hypothesis of joint insignificance (Table 2), the 
results for the regional benchmark income are even less ambiguous compared to the previous results in 
Table 1. 
18  Original question: “Generally speaking, would you say that people can be trusted or that you can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people?” Possible answers were “people can almost be trusted”, “people can usually 
be trusted”, “you usually can’t be too careful in dealing with people” or “you almost always can’t be too 
careful in dealing with people”.  
19  For negative differences in income, the coefficient reveals an increasing marginal trust; whereas for positive 
differences, the estimate indicates a decreasing marginal trust. Again, this result mirrors the findings for the 
happiness variable.  
20  On the other hand, the decisiveness of the squared term of the negative difference is now disguised but, 
again, revealed by the Wald-test on the two income variables.   
21  Original question: “How much confidence do you have in ….(1) parliament (2) business and industry (3) 
churches and religious organizations (4) courts and the legal system”. Possible answers were ”complete 
confidence”, “a great deal of confidence”, “some confidence”, “very little confidence” or “no confidence at 
all”.    43 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
22  Original question: “Consider the situations listed below. Do you feel it is wrong or not wrong if…a taxpayer 
does not report all of [his/her] income in order to pay less income tax”. Possible answers were “not wrong”, 
“a bit wrong”, “wrong” and “seriously wrong”. 
23  In contrast, Fischer and Torgler (2006a, 2006b) report a compliance increasing impact of relative income. 
They use, however, a different definition of reference income level.  
24  There was, however, a tendency for a negative relationship, implying that higher income is associated with a 
lower tax morale, somewhat in line with our results for the national median income (Table 5).  
25  Original  question:  “Do  you  feel  it  is  wrong  or  not  wrong  if  a  person  gives  the  government  incorrect 
information about [himself/herself] to get government benefits that [he/she] is not entitled to”. The range of 
possible answers is the same as in the preceding footnote. 
26  The questionnaire describes the following situation: “Suppose you were riding in a car driven by a close 
friend. You know he is going too fast. He hits a pedestrian. He asks you to tell the police that he was 
obeying the speed limit. Which statement comes closest to your belief about what your friend has a right to 
expect from you?”. Possible answers were “My friend has a DEFINITE right as a friend to expect me to 
testify that he was obeying the speed limit”, “My friend has SOME right as a friend to expect me to testify 
that he was obeying the speed limit” or “My friend has NO right as a friend to expect me to testify that he 
was obeying the speed limit”. 
27  Related question: “Have you done any voluntary activity in the last 12 months in any of the following areas? 
Voluntary activity is unpaid work, not just belonging to an organization or group. It should be of service or 
benefit to other people or the community and not only to one’s family or personal friends. During the last 12 
months, did you do volunteer work in any of the following areas: (a) Political activities (helping political 
parties, political movements, election campaigns, etc.), (b) charitable activities (helping the sick, elderly, 
poor, etc.), (c) religion and church-related activities (helping churches and religious groups), and (d) any 
other kind of voluntary activities?”. Possible answers were (1) no, (2), yes, once or twice, (3) yes, 3–5 times, 
(4) yes, 6 or more times. When answering these questions, respondents were asked to list one voluntary 
activity only once, even when several categories might apply.  
28  Even when employing the national benchmark model, the coefficient on the negative income distances turns 
positive, with significance at the 10 percent level.    44 
                                                                                                                                                   
 
29  Fischer and Torgler (2006b) show that some types of engagement depend on the overall wealth of a country. 
In our model, which focuses solely on effects of individual income, however, this GDP-effect is captured by 
the country and region fixed effects.  
30  Already when using the national median income, in the simple model the coefficient on ‘poorer’ becomes 




National Median Income as a Benchmark for Social Comparison: Social Trust 
  Happiness    Advantage    Gen. trust   
  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. eff. 
 ‘poorer’  -0.698**  -.169**  -0.155  -.034  -0.521**  -.038** 
  [6.72]    [1.50]    [5.12]   
‘poorer’ squared  0.377*  .091*  -0.111  -.024  0.464**  .033** 
  [2.45]    [0.72]    [3.07]   
‘richer’  0.070**  .017**  -0.015  -.003  0.020  .001 
  [6.82]    [1.70]    [1.92]   
‘richer’ squared  -0.000**  -.000*  0.000*  .000*  -0.001*  -.000* 
  [4.37]    [2.02]    [2.53]   
             
Observations  25525    23777    25623   
Pseudo R2  0.1016    0.0633    0.0747   
Wald-test  
(‘poorer’ vars.)  153.13**    36.42**    49.15**   
p-value  0.00    0.00    0.00   
Wald-test  
(‘richer’ vars.)  46.84**    4.68    6.46*   
p-value  0.00    0.10    0.04   
Notes: Ordered probit estimation with country fixed effects. Marginal effects calculated 
at  the  average  for  the  highest  category  of  the  social  capital  variable.  **,  *  denote 





National Median Income as Benchmark for Social Comparison: Social Trust 
  Happiness    Advantage    Gen. trust   
  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. eff. 
 ‘poorer’  -0.467**  -.113**  -0.218**  -.048**  -0.246**  -.018** 
  [12.28]    [5.90]    [6.86]   
‘richer’  0.060**  .015**  -0.007  -.002  -0.001  -.000 
  [5.96]    [1.26]    [0.14]   
             
Observations  25525    23777    25623   
Pseudo R2  0.1013    0.0633    0.0743   
Notes: See Table 1.  
 
 






Regional Median Income as Benchmark for Social Comparison: Social Trust 
  Happiness    Advantage    Gen. trust   
  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. eff. 
 ‘poorer’  -0.651**  -.156**  -0.114  -.025  -0.351**  -.024* 
  [6.15]    [1.08]    [3.39]   
‘poorer’ squared  0.382*  .092*  -0.111  -.024  0.259  .018 
  [2.37]    [0.69]    [1.68]   
‘richer’  0.098**  .023*  -0.000  -.000  0.046**  .003** 
  [8.55]    [0.02]    [3.44]   
‘richer’ squared  -0.002**  -.000**  -0.000  -.000  -0.002  -.000 
  [2.94]    [0.57]    [1.94]   
             
Observations  25525    23777    25623   
Pseudo R2  0.1092    0.0695    0.0849   
Wald-test  
(‘poorer’ vars.)  121.06**    22.74**    28.01**   
p-value  0.00    0.00    0.00   
Wald-test  
(‘richer’ vars.)  86.53**    0.57    13.21**   
p-value  0.00    0.75    0.00   
Notes: Ordered probit estimation with region fixed effects. Marginal effects calculated at the average 
for the highest category of the social capital variable. **, * denote significances at the 1-, and 5-






Regional Median Income as Benchmark for Social Comparison: Social Trust 
  Happiness    Advantage    Gen. trust   
  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. eff. 
 ‘poorer’  -0.427**  -.103**  -0.186**  -.040**  -0.215**  -.015** 
  [11.05]    [4.87]    [5.77]   
‘richer’  0.078**  .019**  -0.004  -.001  0.015  .001 
  [8.04]    [0.48]    [1.67]   
             
Observations  25525    23777    25623   
Pseudo R2  0.1087    0.0695    0.0846   
Notes: See Table 2a 






National Median Income: Confidence in Institutions 
  Parliament    Courts    Business    Church   
  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. 
 ‘poorer’  -0.342**  -.016**  -0.410**  -.035**  -0.508**  -.019**  0.056  .007 
  [3.50]    [4.21]    [5.15]    [0.57]   
‘poorer’ squared  0.325*  .015*  0.394**  .034**  0.375**  .014**  0.018  .002 
  [2.21]    [2.76]    [2.61]    [0.12]   
‘richer’  -0.002  -.000  -0.003  -.000  0.038**  .001**  -0.014  -.002 
  [0.27]    [0.34]    [4.45]    [1.76]   
‘richer’ squared  0.000  .000  0.000  .000  -0.000**  -.000**  0.000*  .000* 
  [0.62]    [0.72]    [4.05]    [2.05]   
                 
Observations  25018    25144    24579    24919   
Pseudo R2  0.0582    0.0595    0.0663    0.1129   
Wald-test  
(‘poorer’ vars.)  20.64**    28.11**    63.98**    3.54   
p-value  0.00    0.00    0.00    0.17   
Wald-test  
(‘richer’ vars.)  4.32    3.89    20.77**    4.60   
p-value  0.12    0.14    0.00    0.10   
Notes: Ordered probit estimation with country fixed effects. Marginal effects calculated at the average 
for the highest category of the social capital variable. **, * denote significances at the 1-, and 5-





National Median Income: Confidence in Institutions 
  Parliament    Courts    Business    Church   
  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. eff. 
‘poorer’  -0.134**  -.006**  -0.155**  -.013**  -0.289**  -.011**  0.075*  .009* 
  [3.81]    [4.47]    [8.13]    [2.11]   
‘richer’  0.001  .000  0.002  .000  0.019*  .001*  -0.006  -.000 
  [0.33]    [0.38]    [2.26]    [1.25]   
                 
Observations  25018    25144    24579    24919   
Pseudo R2  0.0582    0.0594    0.0659    0.1129   












Regional Median Income: Confidence in Institutions 
  Parliament    Courts    Business    Church   
  Coeff. 
Marg.  
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg.  
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg.  
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg.  
eff. 
 ‘poorer’  -0.377**  -.017**  -0.353**  -.029**  -0.399**  -.014*  0.023  .003 
  [3.69]    [3.53]    [3.93]    [0.23]   
‘poorer’ squared  0.343*  .015*  0.288  .024  0.237  .008  0.034  .004 
  [2.20]    [1.93]    [1.57]    [0.22]   
‘richer’  -0.009  -.000  -0.004  -.000  0.060**  .002**  -0.018*  -.002* 
  [0.93]    [0.44]    [5.86]    [2.02]   
‘richer’ squared  0.000  .000  0.000  .000  -0.001**  -.000**  0.000*  .000* 
  [1.15]    [1.13]    [3.42]    [2.04]   
                 
Observations  25018    25144    24579    24919   
Pseudo R2  0.0663    0.0688    0.0762    0.1202   
Wald-test  
(‘poorer’ vars.)  25.62**    26.56**    49.70**    1.46   
p-value  0.00    0.00    0.00    0.48   
Wald-test  
(‘richer’ vars.)  1.38    2.35    34.92**    4.53   
p-value  0.50    0.31    0.00    0.10   
Notes: Ordered probit estimation with region fixed effects. Marginal effects calculated at the 
average for the highest category of the social capital variable. **, * denote significances at the 1-, 





Regional Median Income: Confidence in Institutions 
  Parliament    Courts    Business    Church   
  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. eff. 
‘poorer’  -0.159**  -.007**  -0.168**  -.014**  -0.272**  -.010**  0.051  .006 
  [4.36]    [4.71]    [7.48]    [1.39]   
‘richer’  -0.003  -.000  0.001  .000  0.037**  .001**  -0.011  -.001 
  [0.44]    [0.22]    [4.21]    [1.61]   
                 
Observations  25018    25144    24579    24919   
Pseudo R2  0.0662    0.0688    0.0759    0.1202   
Notes: See Table 4.  







National Median Income: Compliance with Social Norms 
 
Tax 
morale   
Benefit  




  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. eff. 
‘poorer’  -0.155  -.056  -0.328**  -.129*  0.192  .061 
  [1.56]    [3.12]    [1.44]   
‘poorer’ squared  0.152  .055  0.195  .077  -0.271  -.085 
  [1.05]    [1.28]    [1.34]   
‘richer’  -0.024**  -.009**  0.004  .002  -0.012  -.004 
  [2.95]    [0.48]    [1.23]   
‘richer’ squared  0.000**  .000**  -0.000  -.000  0.000  .000 
  [2.75]    [0.92]    [1.22]   
             
Observations  25268    25532    22544   
Pseudo R2  0.0398    0.0541    0.074   
Wald-test  
(‘poorer’ vars.)  3.72    30.32**    2.07   
p-value  0.16    0.00    0.36   
Wald-test  
(‘richer’ vars.)  9.81**    1.60    1.52   
p-value  0.01    0.45    0.47   
Notes: Ordered probit estimation with country fixed effects. Marginal effects calculated at the average 
for the highest category of the social capital variable. **, * denote significances at the 1-, and 5-






National Median Income: Compliance with Social Norms 
 
Tax 
morale   
Benefit  




  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. eff. 
‘poorer’  -0.047  -.017  -0.206**  -.081**  0.027  .008 
  [1.33]    [5.53]    [0.55]   
‘richer’  -0.013*  -.005*  0.001  .000  -0.007  -.002 
  [2.17]    [0.21]    [1.22]   
             
Observations  25268    25532    22544   
Pseudo R2  0.0397    0.0541    0.0739   
Notes: See Table 5.  
 






Regional Median Income: Compliance with Social Norms 
  Tax morale    Benefit morale    Right of friend   
  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. Eff. 
‘poorer’  -0.138  -.050  -0.315**  -.125**  0.198  .061 
  [1.36]    [2.93]    [1.46]   
‘poorer’ squared  0.131  .050  0.223  .088  -0.305  -.094 
  [0.87]    [1.41]    [1.49]   
‘richer’  -0.017  -.006  0.020*  .008*  -0.019  -.006 
  [1.82]    [1.99]    [1.45]   
‘richer’ squared  0.000  .000  -0.001*  -.000*  0.000  .000 
  [0.89]    [1.96]    [1.18]   
             
Observations  25268    25532    22544   
Pseudo R2  0.0515    0.0679    0.0911   
Wald-test  
(‘poorer’ vars.)  3.08    21.97**    2.26   
p-value  0.15    0.00    0.35   
Wald-test  
(‘richer’ vars.)  3.83    4.54    2.13   
p-value  0.21    0.10    0.32   
Notes: Ordered probit estimation with region fixed effects. Marginal effects calculated at the 
average for the highest category of the social capital variable. **, * denote significances at the 1-, 








Regional Median Income: Compliance with Social Norms 
  Tax morale    Benefit morale    Right of friend   
  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. Eff. 
‘poorer’  -0.052  -.019  -0.183**  -.072**  0.011  .003 
  [1.45]    [4.75]    [0.22]   
‘richer’  -0.013  -.005  0.011  .004  -0.015  -.005 
  [1.82]    [1.52]    [1.65]   
             
Observations  25268    25532    22544   
Pseudo R2  0.0515    0.0678    0.0910   
Notes: See Table 6. 






National Median Income: Voluntary Work 
  Politics    Charity    Religion    Other   
  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
Eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. 
‘poorer’  -0.101  -.003  -0.088  -.010  0.083  .003  -0.234  -.028 
  [0.58]    [0.73]    [0.55]    [1.84]   
‘poorer’ squared  0.176  .005  0.276  .032  0.024  .001  0.350  .042 
  [0.71]    [1.58]    [0.11]    [1.87]   
‘richer’  0.008  .000  0.028**  .003**  0.001  .000  0.004  .000 
  [0.61]    [3.41]    [0.12]    [0.32]   
‘richer’ squared  -0.000  -.000  -0.000**  -.000**  -0.000  -.000  -0.000  -.000 
  [0.98]    [3.07]    [0.19]    [0.56]   
                 
Observations  25708    25741    25676    25516   
Pseudo R2  0.0693    0.0775    0.2291    0.1005   
Wald-test  
(‘poorer’ vars.)  0.55    6.79*    3.35    3.58   
p-value  0.76    0.03    0.19    0.17   
Wald-test  
(‘richer’ vars.)  1.03    11.74**    0.05    0.33   
p-value  0.60    0.00    0.98    0.85   
Notes: Ordered probit estimation with country fixed effects. Marginal effects calculated at the average 
for the highest category of the social capital variable. **, * denote significances at the 1-, and 5-







National Median Income: Voluntary Work 
  Politics    Charity    Religion    Other   
  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
Eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. 
‘poorer’  0.004  .000  0.076  .009  0.097  .004  -0.014  -.002 
  [0.07]    [1.77]    [1.83]    [0.30]   
‘richer’  0.001  .000  0.015*  .002*  0.000  .000  0.002  .000 
  [0.16]    [2.31]    [0.04]    [0.29]   
                 
Observations  25708    25741    25676    25516   
Pseudo R2  0.0692    0.0773    0.2291    0.1004   
Notes: See Table 7. 
 
 






Regional Median Income: Voluntary Work 
  Politics    Charity    Religion    Other   
  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. Eff.  Coeff.  Marg. eff.  Coeff.  Marg. eff. 
‘poorer’  -0.075  -.001  -0.023  -.002  0.134  .005  -0.037  -.002 
  [0.42]    [0.19]    [0.86]    [0.28]   
‘poorer’ squared  0.215  .003  0.300  .032  0.019  .001  0.151  .009 
  [0.83]    [1.65]    [0.08]    [0.76]   
‘richer’  0.016  .000  0.039**  .004**  -0.007  -.000  0.034*  .002* 
  [0.97]    [3.72]    [0.47]    [2.32]   
‘richer’ squared  -0.001  -.000  -0.001**  -.000**  -0.000  -.000  -0.002  -.000 
  [0.97]    [3.09]    [0.18]    [1.59]   
                 
Observations  25708    25741    25676    25306   
Pseudo R2  0.0911    0.0928    0.243    .1087   
Wald-test  
(‘poorer’ vars.)  1.65    16.27**    6.76*    1.93   
p-value  0.44    0.00    0.03    0.38   
Wald-test  
(‘richer’ vars.)  1.11    13.91**    1.17    5.40   
p-value  0.57    0.00    0.56    0.07   
Notes: Ordered probit estimation with region fixed effects. Marginal effects calculated at the average 
for the highest category of the social capital variable. **, * denote significances at the 1-, and 5-






Regional Median Income: Voluntary Work 
  Politics    Charity    Religion    Other   
  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
Eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff.  Coeff. 
Marg. 
eff. 
‘poorer’  0.049  .001  0.155**  .016**  0.145**  .005**  0.042  .002 
  [0.78]    [3.45]    [2.62]    [0.87]   
‘richer’  0.005  .000  0.026**  .003**  -0.008  -.000  0.016  .001 
  [0.47]    [3.07]    [0.76]    [1.93]   
                 
Observations  25708    25741    25676    25306   
Pseudo R2  0.091    0.0926    0.243    0.1086   
Notes: See Table 8. 
 
 




Overview of Regression Results of the national and regional income models 
    Social Trust  Confidence in Institutions  Compliance with social 
norms 
Voluntary Work 
  Happiness  Advantage  Gen. 
trust 







Politics  charity  religion  Other 
Flexible functional form 
‘poorer’  -  (-)  -  -  -  -      -      (-)  (+)*   
‘poorer 
squared’ 
+  (-)  +**  +  +  +      (+)      (+)  (+)*   
‘richer’  +    +*      +  -**  -**  +*      +    +* 
‘richer 
squared’ 
-    -**      -  +  +**  -*      -     
Linear functional form 
‘poorer’  -  -  -  -  -  -  +*    -      +*  +*   
‘richer’  +          +    -**        +     
Notes: -, + indicate social capital diminishing / increasing influences, independently significant at least at the 5 or 1 percent level. (–), (+) denote influences that 
are only jointly significant according to the Wald-tests. Exceptions are denoted with ‘*’ and ‘**’, respectively. * significant only in the regional income model, 
** significant only in the national income model.Appendix 
 
Table A1  
Description of Control Variables and Summary Statistics 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Based on the VWS variables   
Main independent variables             
Individual equivalent income yis  0.47  0.96  0.00  11.00  OECD equivalised V216   
National median income (ys)  0.42  0.68  0.00  2.13  See above   
‚poorer’ ys - yis  
if yis < ys  0.17  0.23  0.00  0.99  See above   
‚poorer’ squared  0.08  0.15  0.00  0.97  See above   
‚richer’ yis - ys 
if yis ≥ ys  0.44  1.56  0.00  139.26 
See above 
 
‚richer’ squared  2.63  127.37  0.00  19393.27  See above   
Regional median income (ys)  0.36  0.60  0.00  2.27  See above   
‚poorer’ ys - yis  
if yis < ys  0.16  0.23  0.00  0.98  See above   
‚poorer’ squared  0.08  0.15  0.00  0.96  See above   
‚richer’ yis - ys 
if yis ≥ ys  0.45  1.19  0.00  68.40  See above   
‚richer’ squared  1.62  33.26  0.00  4678.68     
Control variables             
Female  0.53  0.50  0  1  V200   
Age 30–39  0.22  0.42  0  1  V201   
Age 40–49  0.20  0.40  0  1  V201   
Age 50–59  0.16  0.37  0  1  V201   
Age 60–69  0.14  0.34  0  1  V201   
Age 70–79  0.08  0.27  0  1  V201   
Age >  80 years  0.02  0.12  0  1  V201   
Level of education  4.60  1.45  1  7  V205   
Level of education squared  23.23  13.47  1  49  V205   
Single  0.19  0.39  0  1  V202   
Separated or divorced  0.08  0.27  0  1  V202   
Widowed  0.09  0.28  0  1  V202   
attendance of religious services  2.37  2.06  1  9  V59   
Catholic  0.41  0.49  0  1  V217   
Jewish  0.03  0.17  0  1  V217   
Protestant  0.21  0.41  0  1  V217   
Orthodox  0.06  0.23  0  1  V217   
No denomination  0.23  0.42  0  1  V217   
Buddhist  0.02  0.12  0  1  V217   
Muslim  0.01  0.10  0  1  V217   
Urban  0.49  0.50  0  1  Community type variables   
Rural area  0.28  0.45  0  1  See above   
Self-employed  0.09  0.29  0  1  V206   
Unemployed  0.05  0.22  0  1  V206   
Retired  0.19  0.39  0  1  V206   
Housewife  0.10  0.30  0  1  V206   
Disabled  0.02  0.14  0  1  V206   
Out of labour force  0.01  0.10  0  1  V206   
Notes: This table is based on 25525 observations in the happiness regressions. Income variables 





Description of Dependent Variables and Summary Statistics 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max  Based on the VWS 
variables 
Happiness  25525  2.91  0.74  1  4  V4      
Advantage  23777  2.67  0.86  1  4  V18 
Generalized trust  25623  2.28  0.80  1  4  V19 
Confidence in parliament  25018  2.54  1.02  1  5  V20 
Confidence in courts  25144  2.86  1.09  1  5  V21 
Confidence in business  24579  2.72  0.95  1  5  V22 
Confidence in church  24919  2.92  1.20  1  5  V23 
Tax morale  25268  2.97  0.94  1  4  V16 
Benefit morale  25532  3.40  0.79  1  4  V17 
Right of friends  22544  2.67  0.59  1  3  V63 
Voluntary work – politics  25708  1.11  0.47  1  4  V32 
Voluntary work – charity  25741  1.46  0.91  1  4  V33 
Voluntary work – religion  25676  1.29  0.77  1  4  V34 




Table A3  
Descriptive Statistics for the 25 Countries Included 
Country  Freq.  Percent  Happiness  Generalized  
trust 
Confidence  
in parliament  Tax morale  Engagement in  
charity organization 
Germany   1,463  5.73  2.86  2.32  2.40  2.66  1.19 
USA  1,077  4.22  3.24  2.49  2.73  3.13  1.67 
Austria   658  2.58  3.12  2.44  2.70  2.48  1.16 
Hungary  817  3.2  2.45  2.20  2.73  2.98  1.25 
Italy  601  2.35  2.82  1.97  2.21  2.99  1.27 
Netherlands  1,487  5.83  3.24  2.66  3.04  2.83  1.61 
Norway  1,243  4.87  3.10  2.86  3.11  3.02  1.61 
Sweden  849  3.33  3.09  2.74  2.67  3.20  1.52 
Czech Republic  692  2.71  2.88  2.43  2.00  3.12  1.38 
Slovenia  680  2.66  2.74  1.86  2.17  3.11  1.53 
Poland  965  3.78  3.02  2.09  2.26  3.02  1.52 
Bulgaria  938  3.67  2.44  1.98  2.00  3.20  1.34 
Russia  1,039  4.07  2.44  1.97  2.03  2.37  1.26 
New Zealand  783  3.07  3.27  2.53  2.15  3.05  1.83 
Canada  615  2.41  3.08  2.47  2.41  3.11  1.95 
Philippines  1,063  4.16  3.03  2.12  3.40  2.97  2.08 
Israel  831  3.26  2.98  2.05  2.46  2.88  1.65 
Japan  1,044  4.09  3.02  2.22  2.03  3.41  1.26 
Spain  1,570  6.15  3.03  2.27  2.78  3.36  1.26 
Latvia  987  3.87  2.44  1.98  2.08  2.62  1.58 
Slovak Republic  1,120  4.39  2.62  1.87  2.75  3.03  1.49 
France  865  3.39  2.89  2.23  2.32  2.74  1.56 
Portugal  1,073  4.2  2.70  2.11  2.56  3.06  1.27 
Chile  1,241  4.86  2.81  1.88  2.37  2.98  1.45 
Denmark  885  3.47  3.20  2.70  2.71  3.14  1.21 
Switzerland  939  3.68  3.19  2.69  2.92  2.76  1.43 
               
  25,525  100  2.912  2.274  2.501  2.970  1.473 
Notes: Weighted averages of the social capital variables are calculated for the countries and observations of the 
happiness regression model. 
 
  
Table A4  
Determinants of Happiness 
 




  Coeff.  z-value  Coeff.  z-value 
         
‘poorer’  -0.698**  [6.72]  -0.651**  [6.15] 
‘poorer squared’  0.377*  [2.45]  0.382*  [2.37] 
‘richer’  0.070**  [6.82]  0.098**  [8.55] 
‘richer squared’  -0.000**  [4.37]  -0.002**  [2.94] 
         
Female  0.017  [1.08]  0.018  [1.11] 
Age 30-39  -0.217**  [8.42]  -0.222**  [8.58] 
Age 40-49  -0.381**  [13.87]  -0.390**  [14.18] 
Age 50-59  -0.445**  [14.98]  -0.456**  [15.34] 
Age 60-69  -0.394**  [10.61]  -0.407**  [10.89] 
Age 70-79  -0.356**  [8.08]  -0.373**  [8.42] 
Age > 80 years  -0.201**  [2.68]  -0.217**  [2.88] 
Level of education  0.174**  [5.34]  0.176**  [5.36] 
Level of education squared  -0.013**  [4.03]  -0.014**  [4.08] 
Single  -0.378**  [16.31]  -0.387**  [16.58] 
Separated or divorced  -0.463**  [15.94]  -0.472**  [16.26] 
Widowed  -0.500**  [16.07]  -0.505**  [16.11] 
Church attendance  0.044**  [10.36]  0.044**  [10.37] 
Catholic  0.032  [0.64]  0.037  [0.74] 
Jewish  0.644**  [4.92]  0.114  [0.62] 
Protestant  0.137**  [2.74]  0.129*  [2.57] 
Orthodox  0.131  [1.92]  0.131  [1.91] 
No denomination  -0.003  [0.06]  -0.002  [0.04] 
Buddhist  0.049  [0.66]  0.077  [1.01] 
Muslim  -0.004  [0.04]  0.072  [0.64] 
Urban area  -0.006  [0.30]  -0.001  [0.05] 
Rural area  0.058**  [2.71]  0.063**  [2.84] 
Self-employed  0.077**  [2.75]  0.072*  [2.57] 
Unemployed  -0.328**  [9.02]  -0.329**  [8.97] 
Retired  -0.019  [0.63]  -0.019  [0.61] 
Housewife  0.063*  [2.07]  0.060*  [1.97] 
Disabled  -0.341**  [5.79]  -0.340**  [5.75] 
Out of labour force  0.019  [0.25]  0.018  [0.23] 
         
Observations  25525    25525   
Pseudo R2  0.1016    0.1092   
Wald-test (all religious 
denominations)  70.82**    31.57**   
p-value  0.00    0.00   
Notes:  Ordered  probit  estimation  with  country  or  region  fixed  effects,  respectively.  Marginal  effects 
calculated at the average for the highest category of the social capital variable. **, * denote significances at 
the 1-, and 5-,-percent levels, respectively. 
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